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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

This brief is presented on behalf of R. A. l\Ienlove,
for himself and as President of Salt Lake County .Motel
Association.
l

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
On the 27th day of July, 1965, the Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County passed and adopted
an ordinance entitled "Transient Room Tax Ordinance
of the County of Salt Lake," to become effective at
12 o'clock noon on the 1st day of August, 1965. Said
ordinance was adopted by virtue of Chapter 31, Title
17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The
amendment in question was passed by the 1965 Legislature sitting in regular session, which provided for
an increase of the sales tax from 3% to 41/2% on persons
occupying motel and hotel rooms and other similar
accommodations for a period of fewer than 30 days to
be collected by the State Tax Commission.
The appellant herein filed an action in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, contesting
the validity of said ordinance on the ground that it
was unconstitutional, unlawful and ultra viris and
would, if enforced, result in irreparable damage to
appellant. Respondent, Salt Lake County, through its
County Attorney, answered said complaint and also
filed its motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After
hearing arguments on said motion, the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson granted respondent's motion and
entered judged as prayed.
This is an appeal from said judgment.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
It is the contention of appellants that the ordinance
in question is unconstitutional and in violation of the
due process of law and the equal protection of the law
provisions of the state and federal constitution for the
following reasons:
l. The classification of taxpayers in the ordinance

is contrary to constitutional law.

2. The act is arbitrary and unlawful because it

taxes a class of persons who receive no benefits therefrom.
3. Summary judgment on the pleadings was un-

lawful because it deprived appellant of his constitutional
right to prove the arbitrary and discriminatory nature
of the ordinance.

ARGUMENT
l. ClMsification of Taxpayers in the ordinance is

unconstitutional.

The ordinance in question provided for a tax on
temporary occupants of hotels, motels and other accommodations. It is a personal tax which must be paid
by such occupants and is not charged to the owners of
the accommodations, whose responsibility under the act
is to collect the tax for the taxing authorities. In other
words, the classification set up by the ordinance is a
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classification of persons for taxation purposes and not
a classification of property.
It is undisputed that legislatures have wide authority to classify property for taxation and courts have
universally sustained legislative classifications of property both real and personal, unless abusive elements of
discrimination appear within the classifications. But
Courts lrnYe generally frowned upon classifications of
persons or taxpayers (not their property) for the imposition of personal taxes. Such classifications have repeatedly been held to be prohibited by the 14th Amendment, particularly when the objective of the classification was to favor one group of taxpayers to the
detriment of the other. Courts hold closely to the
doctrine that all political power is inherent in the
people and that government is instituted for their equal
protection and benefit. Courts are unwilling to disregard
that mandate by dividing people into separate groups
for taxation purposes.

The Ohio Supreme Court in the case of State ex
rel Struble vs. Davis et al, 9 NE 2nd 684, clarified the
distinction between property classification and personal
classification of taxpayers with the following language:
"However, a classification to be valid must
be a classification of property-the subject of
taxation-and not a classification of taxpayers,
as was the situation under consideration in the
case of State ex rel Hostetter vs. Hunt et al,
9 NE 2nd 676, this day decided." P 688 (2).
In the Hunt case, the Court said, P. 681 (8):
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"In order to determine whether a law is for
the equal protection and benefit of the people
it is necessary to ascertain whether it operates
equally upon all persons charged with the same
obligation. If the result of the operation of the
law is such that some persons are obliged to pay
taxes on certain kinds of property for certain
years while other persons owning the same kind
of property during the same years are released
from such obligations, it cannot in good conscience be said that such a measure conforms to
the equal protection clause of the Constitution."
On Page 683 it continues:
"While the classification amendment effective
January l, 1931, gave the General Assembly the
authority to classify personal property for the
purpose of taxation, it did not give the legislature the power to classify taxpayers so as to distribute the burden of taxation unequally. The
statute under consideration does attempt to
divide taxpayers into two classes. To sanction
such legislation enacted in violation of Section
2 of Article l of the constitution would be an
injudicious construction of constitutional law.
To say that such classification comes within the
equal protection clause of the Constitution is to
misunderstand their true purpose."
"A classification to be valid must be a classification of property and not a classification of
taxpayers." Ireland v. EYatt, 32 NE 2nd 847.
Most courts adhere to this doctrine and ref use to
uphold legislative efforts to classify taxpayers. The
Utah Supreme Court did so in the case of Moon Lake
Electric Association vs. Utah State Tax Commission,
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345 P2nd 612.

In that case the legislature classified
corporations into Co-op and non Co-op groups for the
purpose of giving to the Co-op group special tax concessions not enjoyed by the other group. Even though
it was shown that such a classification would be beneficial to the people of the state and was much desired,
the Court nullified the act and refused to sanction such
a classification of taxpayers.
The basic doctrine upon which our government
was founded was that all men are created equal and
that all have equal rights and opportunities under the
law. Such a concept of government makes it prohibitive
to impose direct taxes on people and to then classify
the taxpayers so that some citizens are given special
consideration. Their property can be classified and there
is nothing in the constitution of the state of Utah or
of the Federal Government which forbids such classifications, but direct taxes on individuals must reach
everyone alike. Such direct taxes as Poll Taxes, Sales
and Luxury Taxes apply to all people alike. Tax rates
and regulations are universal in their application. The
legislature has no authority under the constitution to
classify the taxpayers themselves for the purpose of
imposing separate benefits or advantages to any class.
Such taxes must be made to apply alike to all persons.
In fact it seems hard to conceive of any classification
of taxpaypers where a levy is made directly on them,
wherein the purpose of the classification was not to
favor one group as against another. It appears that
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any variation from uniformity in taxation imposed
directly on taxpayers is discriminatory.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case makes
it clear that the ordinance in question is in violation
of the equal rights provisions of both State and Federal
Constitutions.
The ordinance is titled as a room occupancy tax,
but a reading of the ordinance shows that it is nothing
more than an increase of the Sales Tax rate on certain
persons which the legislature designated as "transients."
It is a clear cut classification of taxpayers into two
groups, and an imposition of a tax burden levied on
one group and exempting the other.
Attempts of legislatures to use language to cover
up the true purpose of legislation is quite common. In
such cases the United States Supreme Court has outlined the responsibilities of the Courts which interpret
legislation of this nature, in the following language:
Wisconsin vs. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435.
"In whatever language a statute is framed, its
purpose must be determined by its natural and
reasonable effect. In passing on its constitutionality we are concerned only with its practical
operation, not its definition or the precise form
of descriptive words which may be applied to
it."
The ordinance m the instant case classifies taxpayers into two groups for the purpose of ra1smg
revenue to advertise the County. One group is com-
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posed of "transients" who occupy rental accommodations in hotels, motels and other similar accommodations
for less than 30 days, and the other group is made up
of all other taxpayers, those who occupy such rental
accommodations for more than 30 days as well as all
other temporary and permanent residents of the county.
Percentage wise only a very small percentage of people
who reside in Salt Lake County for any length of time
must pay the tax under the classification in the ordinance.
It is obvious that most tourists or transients reside
in hotels and motels for less than 30 days at a time.
It is also well known that many of them reside in such
places for more than 30 days at a time. Under the
ordinance the one group is taxed and the other exempted. l\1any transients who remain in the county
for more than 30 days change hotels and motels, sometimes several times, during the period of their stay in
the County. In such cases those who stay in one place
are exempt while the ones who move during the month
are taxed. Such a classification is discriminatory, unreasonable and unrealistic for it is set up so as to tax
some and exempt others of the same class. If tourists
or transients are to be taxed for any purpose, the tax
being a direct tax on all taxpayers, must reach all alike.
Under our form of government a classification of these
persons so as to tax some of them and exempt others
is highly discriminatory and unconstitutional.

Referring again to the language of the Court m
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the Wisconsin vs. J.C. Penney case, supra, the "natural
nnd reasonable effect" and the "practical operation"
of the ordinance is clearly discriminatory even as between transients.
Many transients in our state reside in other places
than hotels, motels and places of similar nature. These
enjoy all of the advantages offered by the county to
transients and yet they escape the tax entirely. Most
of the money spent in the county by transients is spent
for other things than sleeping accommodations, yet the
entire burden and expense of collecting the tax is placed
on motel and hotel operators while all other business
organizations escape this burden. Such conditions
imposed by the ordinance are unreasonable and unjust
and discriminatory.
2. The act is discriminatory and unconstitutional

because it taxes a class of people who receive no benefit
therefrom.
A classification which places a tax on persons who
receive nothing in return is unlawful. A universally
accepted axiom of the law is the following: "In classifying for taxation, an obligation on the taxing powers
to make available some benefit to them must exist."
Referring again to the J. C. Penney case, supra, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated:
"The test of whether property is taken without due process of law, or if paraphrase we must,
whether the taxing power exerted by the state
bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities
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and benefits given by the state, the simple but
controJling question is whether the state has
given anything for which it can ask a return."
The court held that if the taxpayer received nothing
the tax was an arbitrary one in violation of the 14th
Amendment.
It is conceded that when tax revenues go into a
fund for the operation of government, the taxpayer
receives ample returns for the taxes he pays through
police, fire and many other advantages provided
for him and all citizens by the government. But such
is not the case in the instant case. The ordinance specifically provides that

"No fund collected and received by Salt Lake
County by virtue of the tax imposed hereby shall
be used for any purpose other than establishing,
financing and promoting recreational, tourist
and convention bureaus." (Section 5 of the
ordinance) .
In other words, all of the returns from the tax shall
be used to set up bureaus to advertise and promote
Salt Lake County. Such bureaus are set up for the
benefit of the businesses of the county, and the purpose
of the bureau is to induce tourists to come to Salt Lake
County to spend their money with local business establishments. Salt Lake County businesses receive all of
the benefits of the tax money. Certainly no one coul<l
seriously contend that the "natural and reasonable"
effect of the tax or the "practical effect" thereof could
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possibly inure to the benefit of the tourist or transient
who pays it, or to anyone except those who pay none
of the tax under the terms of the ordinance. The State
Legislature and the Salt Lake County Commission
have hit upon a unique plan which imposes a tax on a
few people who receive no benefit from it to pay for
the advertising of the county for the sole benefit of
non-payers of the tax. Applying the language of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the .J. C. Penney case, supra,
to the instant case, it becomes apparent that the ordinance is unconstitutional for it gives nothing to transient
guests in motels and hotels for which it can ask tax
payments in return. This makes the tax an arbitrary
one in violation of both Federal and State Constitutions.
The discrimination is extended to the appellant
and other operators of hotels and motels, for the act
imposes upon them the discriminatory responsibility
and entire expense of collecting the tax even though
only a very small percentage of the dollars spent by
transients in Salt Lake County is spent for hotel and
motel accommodations.
If it is legal and advisable for the legislature of
Utah to authorize a tax to advertise Utah, it should
have enacted a tax law which would reach all of the
people of the state - the ones who will receive the
benefits from such advertising; or a tax which would
reach all occupants of hotels and motels, instead of
a few of them, for the legislature has no authority to
classify taxpayers for the purpose of imposing a burden
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on a few for the benefit of others, as has been pointed
out above.
3. Snmmary Judgment on Pleadings was unlawful.

It is universally accepted that though legislative
bodies have authority to classify property for taxation
purposes. It is also universally accepted that any arbitrary or discriminatory classification of such property
is unconstitutional. Every taxpayer has the right to
be heard on such an issue and to present evidence that
a tax imposed upon him is in violation of the constitution.

The appellant in the instant case pleaded that the
ordinance referred to herein was unconstitutional, discriminatory and unlawful. The only way he had of
protecting his rights under the constitution was to offer
evidence proving that the ordinance in question was
causing him to suffer irreparable damage because of
its unconstitutionality. The Summary Judgment en·
tered by the court on the pleadings was improper and
did deprive appellant of his right to offer evidence in
support of the allegations in his pleadings.
For the court to dismiss the proceedings of appellant on summary judgment without giving appellant
the right to present evidence showing that the act was
discriminatory as to him or that it was palpably arbitrary or grossly unequal in its application to the appellants was error.
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CONCLUSION
Because of the unconstitutionality of the transient
tax ordinance passed by Salt Lake County Commission
on the points discussed herein, appellant prays that
the act be nullified by the court and the summary judgment of the lower court be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

HERBERT B. MAW

Attorney for Appellants
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